“Help Me, Help You”: Defense Department Advises Contractors That Cybersecurity Is An Allowable Cost

During a presentation at the Professional Services Council Federal Acquisition Conference on June 13, 2019, a high-ranking Department of Defense (“DoD”) official announced, with dramatic flair, that cybersecurity is an allowable cost:

“I need you all now to get out your pens and you better write this down and tell your teams: Hear it from Katie Arrington [Special Assistant to the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Cyber] . . . security is an allowable cost. Amen, right?”

Channeling Jerry McGuire, Arrington added: “Now what you need to do as industry is help me, help you. I’m not the enemy. I’m literally the one person in government who said, ‘Hi, I’m here to help and I’m legit here to help.’”

Arrington’s June 13 presentation, which was titled “Securing the Supply Chain,” is just the latest indication that the DoD – like other federal and state agencies – is making the cyber hygiene of its contractors a priority. (Some of our previous posts on this topic are available here.)

During a webinar earlier this month, Arrington noted that, “[i]f we were doing all the necessary security controls, we wouldn’t be getting exfiltrated to the level that we are. We need to level set because a good portion of our defense industrial base [(“DIB”)] doesn’t have robust cyber hygiene. Only 1% of DIB companies have implemented all 110 controls from the National Institute of Standards and Technology. We need to get to scale where the vast majority of DIB partners can defend themselves from nation state attacks.”

Arrington, who appears to be actively involved in the DoD’s development of a cybersecurity assessment and certification program, called the Cybersecurity Maturity Model Certification or CMMC, provided additional details about that program during her June 13 presentation.   Specifically, Arrington announced that:

  1. The CMMC will include five levels of certification. The levels will range from “basic” cyber hygiene to “state-of-the-art.”
  2. The CMMC initiative will require DoD contractor information systems to be certified compliant by an outside auditor. Under the new model, third-party cybersecurity certifiers will “conduct audits, collect metrics, and inform risk mitigation for the entire supply chain,” Arrington said. “Every contract that goes out,” she added, “will have a requirement and every vendor on that contract will have to get certified.”
  3. The DoD will hold 12 listening sessions across the country this summer to solicit feedback about the CMMC from industry and other experts.
  4. The DoD aims to complete the CMMC and begin certifying vendors by January 2020; to begin incorporating the CMMC requirements into requests for information by June 2020; and to include the CMMC in solicitations by September 2020.

Driving home her key point that the cybersecurity of its vendors is a major priority for the DoD, Arrington stated that “[c]ost, schedule and performance are only effective in a security environment.” She added that “[w]e cannot look at security and be willing to trade off to get lower cost, better performing product or to get something faster. If we do that, nothing works and it will cost me more in the long run.”

DoD contractors should heed Arrington’s warning that cost, schedule, and performance will not alone suffice to win future DoD contracts. To best position themselves to compete for those contracts, contractors should consider providing feedback to the DoD this summer about the CMMC, and should promptly begin the process of preparing to comply with its mandates.

 

U.S. Supreme Court Leaves Open the Issue of FCC Interpretation of TCPA, For Now

The U.S. Supreme Court issued its long awaited decision in PDR Network LLC v. Carlton, addressing the issue of whether the Hobbs Act requires the district court to accept the 2006 Federal Communication Commission (FCC) Order 2006 (“the Order”), which provides the legal interpretation for the Telephone Consumer Protection Act (TCPA). Unfortunately, the Court did not answer the question presented when it granted certiorari – whether the Hobbs Act required the district court to accept the FCC’s legal interpretation of the TCPA. Instead, the Court held that the extent to which the district court must defer to the FCC depends on two preliminary issues that the Court of Appeals failed to consider: 1) whether the Order is equivalent to a “legislative rule” which has the “force and effect of law” or an “interpretative rule” which does not have the “force and effect of law”, and 2) whether the defendant had the “prior” and “adequate” opportunity to seek judicial review of the Order. As a result, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals judgment was reversed, and remanded for the Court to address these issues.

The full length article discussing the Supreme Court’s decision in PDR Network LLC v. Carlton on the Jackson Lewis P.C. website, is available here.

New York Considers Aggressive Consumer Privacy Law

The California Consumer Privacy Act (CCPA), which goes into effect January 1, 2020, is considered the most robust state privacy law in the United States. The CCPA seems to have spurred a flood of similar legislative proposals on the state level, and it was only a matter of time before the Empire State introduced its own version of the law. The New York Privacy Act (NYPA), s5642, introduced last month by New York Senator Kevin Thomas, the Chair of the Consumer Protection Committee, is considered a more expansive version of its California counterpart.

Similar to the CCPA, the NYPA would provide consumers with greater control over their personal data, and impose substantial duties on businesses that control and process data, however the NYPA is distinct from the CCPA in significant ways. Below are several key features of the NYPA:

  • Application: Unlike the CCPA, which only applies to businesses with a threshold of $25 million annual revenue, the NYPA applies to “legal entities that conduct business in New York” or that produce products or services that “intentionally target” New York residents. This means that small-to-medium size businesses, and potentially even not-for-profit organizations will be subject to the law’s privacy and security obligations. Organizations exempted include state and local governments, and personal data that is regulated by HIPAA, HITECH, GLBA and notably, “data sets maintained for employment records purposes”.
  • Consumer Rights: The NYPA provides consumers a broad set of rights over their personal data. Consumer rights include: the right to access, the right to rectification, right to delete, right to stop processing and right to have data portability.   This extends the rights afforded to consumers by the CCPA, as the CCPA does not include a right to rectification.
  • Privacy and Security Obligations: Under the NYPA, covered businesses would be required to “exercise the duty of care, loyalty and confidentiality . . . with respect to securing the personal data of a consumer against a privacy risk; and shall act in the best interests of the consumer, without regard to the interests of the entity, . . . in a manner expected by a reasonable consumer under the circumstances.” In addition businesses are required to “reasonably secure personal data from unauthorized access” and “promptly” notify consumers of a breach. Finally, the law prevents businesses from using personal data in a way that “(i) benefits an online service provider to the detriment of an end user; (ii) would result in reasonably foreseeable physical or financial harm to a consumer; or (iii) would be unexpected and “highly offensive” to a “reasonable consumer.”
  • Enforcement: The New York State Attorney General may bring an action in the name of the state, or on behalf of residents of the state, however a private right of action is also available to any person injured by reason of violation of the law. If passed, this enforcement provision would likely create an influx of litigation. A similar cause of action exists under an Illinois privacy law that you might have heard about, the Illinois Biometric Information Privacy Act or “BIPA.” That provision has resulted in flood of litigation, including putative class actions, seeking to recover statutory damages for plaintiffs who allege their biometric information has been collected and/or disclosed in violation of the statute. This is arguably the most significant difference between the CCPA. Despite several attempts to expand the private right of action, in its current form the CCPA only allows for a private right of action in very limited circumstances, if a nonencrypted or nonredacted personal information is subject to an unauthorized access, exfiltration, theft, or disclosure because the covered business did not meet its duty to implement and maintain reasonable safeguards to protect that information.

The NYPA is still in the very early stages of the legislative process – it has only been reviewed by the Senate’s Consumer Protection Committee, and is still looking for a co-sponsor from the state Assembly. Nonetheless, such an aggressive bill signifies the seriousness in which New York is considering privacy and security matters.  Organizations, regardless of their location, should be assessing and reviewing their data collection activities, building robust data protection programs, and investing in written information security programs (WISPs).

 

Oregon Amends Data Breach Notification Law to Include Vendor Obligations; Expanded Definition of Personal Information

As we recently noted, Washington state amended its data breach notification law on May 7 to expand the definition of “personal information” and shorten the notification deadline (among other changes). Not to be outdone by its sister state to the north, Oregon followed suit shortly thereafter—Senate Bill 684 passed unanimously in both legislative bodies on May 20, and was signed into law by Governor Kate Brown on May 24. The amendments will become effective January 1, 2020.

Among the changes effected by SB 684 is a trimming of the Act’s short title—now styled the “Oregon Consumer Information Protection Act” or “OCIPA” (formerly the “Oregon Consumer Identity Theft Protection Act” or “OCITPA”). Apart from establishing a much more palatable acronym, the amended short title mirrors the national (and international) trend of expanding laws beyond mere “identity theft protection” to focus on larger scale consumer privacy and data rights.

Key substantive changes to the data breach notification law include:

  • Expanding the definition of “breach of security” to cover personal information that a person “maintains or possesses” (where previously only information a person “maintains” was covered);
  • Adding an individual’s account username and password (or other means of account identification and authentication) to the definition of “personal information” sufficient to trigger breach notification obligations—whether or not combined with the individual’s real name;
  • Defining the terms “covered entity” and “vendor,” to replace the cumbersome language in the current statute (g., “A person that owns or licenses personal information that the person uses in the course of the person’s business, vocation, occupation or volunteer activities and that was subject to a breach shall give notice . . . .” becomes “A covered entity that was subject to a breach shall give notice . . . .”).
  • Creating new obligations for “vendors,” including a requirement to notify the applicable covered entity within 10 days of discovery of a breach, and a requirement that the vendor notify the state Attorney General if said breach affects more than 250 consumers or an undetermined number of consumers (notification to the covered entity was previously only required “as soon as is practicable” after discovery, and vendors had no obligation to notify the Attorney General); and,
  • Specifying that covered entities or vendors in compliance with HIPAA or the GLBA (and subject thereto) are exempt from the state’s data breach notification requirements, and adding that compliance with the data security safeguards set forth in HIPAA or the GLBA may be raised as an affirmative defense in any action alleging that a covered entity or vendor has failed to comply with OCIPA’s own data security safeguarding requirements.

For organizations subject to the new law, including anyone that “owns, licenses, maintains, stores, manages, collects, processes, acquires or otherwise possesses personal information” in the course of business, the biggest change to note is that the disclosure of usernames and passwords alone is not sufficient to trigger breach notification obligations. Companies should also make an effort to determine whether they may be acting as a “vendor” under OCIPA’s new definition (“a person with which a covered entity contracts to maintain, store, manage, process or otherwise access personal information”), as vendor entities will have new obligations when the amendments go into effect on January 1, 2020.

Sweeping Privacy Changes Stall in the Lone Star State

Per our earlier blog post, Texas was ambitious this legislative session when it proposed two consumer data privacy bills. Both bills made it through committee hearings, but only one made it to the governor’s desk for signature: HB 4390. However, even it arrived there very different than originally drafted.

HB 4390, dubbed the Texas Privacy Protection Act, started as a comprehensive consumer privacy bill, with parts similar to the European Union’s GDPR and California’s Consumer Protection Act. However, through multiple amendments and dilutions, what was left were essentially two things:

The general updates to the TITEPA include:

  • Requirement that affected individuals be notified within 60 days after the breach. This replaces the current language in the statute “as quickly as possible”; and
  • Requirement that the business experiencing the breach notify the state Attorney General if the breach affected at least 250 Texas residents.

These provisions will become effective January 1, 2020.

The Council will study other state and global data privacy laws in advance of the next legislative session and make recommendations. They will present their findings on or before September 1, 2020, and these recommendations will likely form the basis for consumer privacy legislation when the Texas Legislature reconvenes in January 2021.

 

Vermont Court Finds Patient Can Sue Hospital and an Employee for Breach of Confidentiality

In a landmark ruling, the Vermont Supreme Court recently held that a patient had standing to sue both the hospital at which she was a patient and the employee who attended to her, for negligent disclosure of her personal health information to a third-party. Neither the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) nor Vermont law provide for a private cause of action for damages arising from a medical provider’s disclosure of information obtained during treatment.

In this case, the plaintiff claims that the emergency room nurse who cared for her lacerated arm, later informed a police officer that she was intoxicated, had driven to the hospital, and intended to drive home. Ultimately, the Court concluded that “no reasonable factfinder could determine the disclosure was for any purpose other than to mitigate the threat of imminent and serious harm to the plaintiff and the public”.

While this conclusion is not surprising, what is a bit surprising is the Court’s allowance for this private cause of action to proceed in the first place, given that neither HIPAA nor Vermont law allow for such. The Court reasoned that in recognizing this private cause of action on the basis of common law, other courts have correctly relied on the theory of a breach of duty of confidentiality, insofar as “health care providers enjoy a special fiduciary relationship with their patients” such that “recognition of the privilege is necessary to ensure that the bond remains.”

The Court highlighted further that as evidence of sound public policy underlying the recognition of liability for breach of the duty of confidentiality, courts have cited “(1) state physician licensing statutes, (2) evidentiary rules and privileged communication statutes which prohibit a physician from testifying in judicial proceedings; (3) common law principles of trust, and (4) the Hippocratic Oath and principles of medical ethics which proscribe the revelation of patient confidences.”

The Vermont court joins many other jurisdictions across the United States honoring a private right of action in the context of a breach of the duty of confidentiality, on the basis of public policy. This decision further signifies the heightened focus being placed on an individual’s right to privacy and security of their data. Employers across all industries, but particularly healthcare, are advised to revisit their approach to maintaining sensitive personal information confidentially and securely, as legislation and common law continues to strengthen in this area.

 

Senate Committee Blocks CCPA Bill to Expand Private Right of Action

The California Senate Appropriations Committee recently blocked a bill that would expand a private right of action under the California Consumer Privacy Act (CCPA). As we reported, in late February, California Attorney General Xavier Becerra and Senator Hannah-Beth Jackson introduced Senate Bill 561, legislation intended to strengthen and clarify the CCPA. Then in April, the Senate Judiciary Committee referred the bill to the Senate Appropriations Committee by a vote of 6-2.

If SB 561 became law, it would make a number of significant changes to the current law. In particular, SB 561 would significantly expand the scope of the private right of action presently written into the CCPA. The CCPA provides consumers a private right of action if their nonencrypted or nonredacted personal information is subject to an unauthorized access, exfiltration, theft, or disclosure because the covered business did not meet its duty to implement and maintain reasonable safeguards to protect that information. SB 561 proposed to broaden this provision to grant consumers a private right of action if their rights under the CCPA are violated.

This week however, the Senate Appropriations Committee blocked the bill, which is likely to end its legislative process, at least for this year, as in order for a bill to advance in the legislature during 2019, it must pass at least one chamber by May 31.

The bill’s blockage is considered a win for businesses, as expansion of the private right of action would only increase what is already anticipated to be a flood of litigation once the CCPA takes effect.

County in PA Faces up to $68 Million in Privacy Related Damages

No industry or sector is immune to privacy or security issues.  This week a jury in a district court in Pennsylvania awarded $1,000 to each of the 68,000 class members who claimed that Bucks County, a county just outside Philadelphia, and several other municipal entities, violated state law by making their criminal records public, in Taha v Bucks County. Bucks County potentially faces up to $68 million in damages.

This case arises from claims brought by Daryoush Taha in 2012, who alleged that the county’s inmate search tool, which was made available to the public in 2008, included access to an online database with criminal history records for all current and former Bucks County Correctional Facility inmates dating back to 1938 (nearly 68,000 individuals), in violation of Pennsylvania’s Criminal History Records Information Act (“CHRIA”).

In 2016, the district court granted summary judgment in favor of Taha, holding that Bucks County violated the CHRIA by releasing criminal history records for incidents older than three years that did not result in a conviction. Further the district court certified a class of individuals for claims against the County regarding similar CHRIA violations stemming from public access to the online database.

As part of evidence, the plaintiffs pointed to an email exchange between two Bucks County employees regarding the online database, where the two concluded that only social security numbers required protection, without checking requirements under the CHRIA. The plaintiffs argued that failure to properly review state law was an indication of “reckless indifference” regarding whether the online base was in violation of the law. Under the CHRIA, punitive damages are awarded where there is a “willful” violation of the law. The court agreed with the plaintiffs that the definition of a “willful” violation in the context of the CHRIA should be considered “reckless difference”, and that the actions of the County employees indeed amounted to “reckless indifference”. Interestingly, the inmate search tool had undergone several audits by the Pennsylvania State Police and Pennsylvania’s Office of Attorney General and neither found any CHRIA violation.

Although the jury awarded $1000 per individual to nearly 68,000 individuals, totaling nearly $68 million in damages, this amount will likely be slightly less as some of the individuals in the initial class certification are deceased, but no small sum of money regardless.

With the EU’s GDPR one year in, California’s CCPA on the brink, and a myriad of other federal, state and local regulations taking effect or under consideration, and Pennsylvania’s own Supreme Court finding a common law obligation to safeguard personal information, the public’s sensitivity to privacy and security issues only continues to grow. Whether your organization is public or private, whether it is part of an industry highly susceptible to data breaches such as healthcare, or believed to be less susceptible like construction, it should be reevaluating its privacy and security programs and ensuring compliance with relevant legislation.

The GDPR – One Year and Counting

The GDPR is wrapping up its first year and moving full steam ahead. This principles-based regulation has had a global impact on organizations as well as individuals. While there continue to be many questions about its application and scope, anticipated European Data Protection Board guidance and Data Protection Authority enforcement activity should provide further clarity in the upcoming year. In the meantime, here are a few frequently asked questions – some reminders of key principles under the GDPR and others addressing challenges for implementation and what lies ahead.

Can US organizations be subject to the jurisdiction of the GDPR?

Whether a US organization is subject to the GDPR is a fact-based determination. Jurisdiction may apply where the US organization has human or technical resources located in the EU and processes EU personal data in the context of activities performed by those resources. In cases where the US organization does not have human or technical resources located in the EU, it may be subject to the GDPR’s jurisdiction in two instances: if the organization targets individuals in the EU (not businesses) by offering goods or services to them, regardless of whether payment is required, or if it monitors the behavior of individuals in the EU and uses that personal data for purposes such as profiling (e.g. website cookies, wearable devices). The GDPR may also apply indirectly to a US organization through a data processing agreement.

If we execute a data processing agreement, does that make our US organization subject to the GDPR?

When an organization subject to the GDPR engages a third party to process its EU data, the GDPR requires that the organization impose contractual obligations on the third party to implement certain GDPR-based safeguards. If you are not otherwise subject to the GDPR, executing a data processing agreement will not directly subject you to the GDPR. Instead, it will contractually obligate you to follow a limited, specific set of GDPR-based provisions. Your GDPR-based obligations will be indirect in that they are contractual in nature.

Does the GDPR apply only to the data of EU citizens?

No, the GDPR applies to the processing of the personal data of data subjects who are in the EU regardless of their nationality or residence.

Is our organization subject to the GDPR if EU individuals access our website and make purchases?

If your organization does not have human or technical resources in the EU, the mere accessibility of your website to EU visitors, alone, will not subject you to the GDPR. However, if your website is designed to target EU individuals (e.g. through features such as translation to local language, currency converters, local contact information, references to EU purchasers, or other accommodations for EU individuals) your activities may be viewed as targeting individuals in the EU and subject you to the GDPR.

Are we required to delete an individual’s personal data if they request it?

If your organization is subject to the GDPR, an individual may request that you delete their personal data. However, this is not an absolute right. Your organization is not required to delete the individual’s personal data if it is necessary

  • for compliance with a legal obligation or the establishment, exercise or defense of a legal claim
  • for reasons of public interest (e.g. public health, scientific, statistical or historical research purposes)
  • to exercise the right of freedom of expression or information
  • where there is a legal obligation to keep the data
  • or where you have anonymized the data.

Additional consideration should be given to any response when the individual’s data is also contained in your back-ups.

GDPR principles have started to influence law in the U.S. In fact, many have been watching developments regarding the California Consumer Privacy Act (CCPA), which shares a right to delete as it pertains to the personal information of a California resident. Similar to the GDPR, it is not an absolute right and in certain cases an exception may apply. For instances, both law contain an exception from the right to have personal information deleted when the information is needed to comply with certain laws.

Does the GDPR apply to an EU citizen who works in the US?

If your organization is not subject to the GDPR and you hire an EU citizen to work in the US, the GDPR may not apply to the processing of their personal data in the US. However, depending on the circumstances, the answer may be different if the EU citizen is in the US on temporary assignment from an EU parent. In that scenario, their data may be subject to the GDPR if the US entity’s relationship with the parent creates an establishment in the EU, and it processes this data in the context of the activities of that establishment. To the extent the EU parent transfers the EU employee’s personal data from the EU to the US entity, that transfer may require EU-US Privacy Shield certification, the execution of binding corporate rules, or standard contractual clauses. These measures are designed to ensure data is protected when it is transferred to a country, such as the US, that is not deemed to have reasonable safeguards.

Do we need to obtain an EU individual’s consent every time we collect their personal data?

If your organization is subject to the GDPR and processes an EU individual’s information, you must have a “legal basis” to do so. Consent is just one legal basis. In addition to consent, two of the most commonly used legal basis are the “legitimate interests” of your organization and the performance of a contract with the individual. A legitimate interest is a business or operational need that is not outweighed by the individual’s rights (e.g. processing personal data for website security, conducting background checks, or coordinating travel arrangements). Processing necessary to the performance of a contract is activity that enables you to perform a contract entered into with the individual (e.g. processing employee data for payroll pursuant to the employment contract or processing consumer data for shipping goods under a purchase order.)

Should we obtain an employee’s consent to process their personal data?

Read More

Washington Overhauls its Data Breach Notification Law

As we noted last month, Washington’s efforts to follow California’s lead in passing its own GDPR-like law have stalled after the bill failed to make its way through the state’s House of Representatives—despite overwhelming approval in the Senate (where it passed 46-1).  That bill’s sponsor has promised to revisit the issue during the 2020 legislative session.

Despite this roadblock on the consumer privacy front, Washington governor Jay Inslee signed a bill on May 7 (HB 1071) significantly expanding the state’s data breach notification law, RCW 19.255.01, et seq.  There was little doubt that Governor Inslee would sign the bill into law, as it passed unanimously in both state legislative bodies.

Below is a summary of major changes to the state’s data breach notification law, and key takeaways for employers subject to Washington law.  For a detailed explanation of the law’s new provisions—which will become effective March 1, 2020—please refer to this post.

Deadline to provide notice of breach shortened to thirty (30) days following discovery.

Under the current law (and until HB 1071’s amendments become effective on March 1, 2020), notice of a breach must be provided within 45 days of discovery. With the amendments, notice must be provided no more than thirty days after the organization discovers the breach. This applies to notices sent to affected consumers as well as to the state’s Attorney General. The threshold requirement for notice to the Attorney General remains the same—it is only required if 500 or more Washington residents were affected by the breach.

Thirty days may still sound like plenty of time, but it can often take several days, or even weeks, for an entity to determine the scope of a breach and compile a list of potentially affected consumers. And if the breach affected residents of more than one state, each state’s laws must be examined to ensure that the notices sent to each individual comport with the breach notification laws of that individual’s state of residence.

Definition of “personal information” significantly expanded.

The previous definition tracked the language used by the majority of states, and only covered breaches that included an individual’s first name (or initial) and last name, plus any one or more of the three “bare minimum” data elements— Social Security number, driver’s license or state ID number, and/or financial account or card number (with an access code or password that would permit access thereto).

With the amendment, Washington adds the following six additional data elements that will be considered “personal information” if combined with an individual’s first name or initial and last name:

  • Full date of birth;
  • Unique private key used to authenticate or sign an electronic record;
  • Passport, military, or student ID number;
  • Health insurance policy or identification number;
  • Information about a consumer’s medical history, physical or mental health condition, or diagnosis or treatment by a health care professional; and,
  • Biometric data (such as fingerprint or retina scans, voiceprints, or other unique biological patterns used to identify an individual).

Significantly, Washington law now considers an individual’s username (or email address) and password (or security questions sufficient to permit access to an account) to be “personal information” regardless of whether the individual’s name is included. Notice to affected consumers of a breach of this type may be provided electronically or by email (unless the affected account was the individual’s email account).

In addition, the new law provides that even without an individual’s first name or initial and last name, any one or more of the other data elements will be considered “personal information” if the element, or combination of elements, would permit a person to commit identity theft against the individual, and the data element(s) were not rendered unusable though encryption, redaction or other methods.

Finally, as discussed more thoroughly in this post, HB 1071 also added notice requirements for affected consumers and the Attorney General—though notice to the Attorney General is still not required unless 500 or more Washington residents were affected by the breach.

There are several takeaways for employers here:

  • First, employers must be aware of the types of data elements the organization maintains on its employees (or other individuals, such as customers or clients), how that data is maintained, and what happens to that data when it is no longer needed.
  • Employers should also examine the necessity of maintaining certain types of data, and consider narrowing the scope of data elements that the organization maintains by ceasing to collect and maintain unnecessary data—even if not currently listed in the state’s definition of “personal information.”
  • Until now, Washington employers may not have been overly concerned with securing certain types of data, such as an employee’s date of birth or health insurance policy number. But once HB 1071’s amendments take effect, that information could trigger breach notification duties if subject to unauthorized access or disclosure.
  • Finally, employers should ensure the organization has sound policies in place specifically to deal with sensitive data (e., “personal information”) deemed necessary to maintain.
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