Workplace Privacy, Data Management & Security Report : Privacy Lawyers & Attorneys : Jackson Lewis Law Firm : Data Security, HIPAA & Confidentiality Issues

Written by Michelle Hackim

In United States v. Jones, the Supreme Court unanimously decided that FBI agents violated the Fourth Amendment when they attached a Global-Positioning-System (GPS) tracking device to a suspected drug dealer’s Jeep Cherokee and monitored the vehicle’s movements on public streets for 28 days without obtaining a warrant to do so. Justice Scalia wrote the Court’s opinion, with four justices joining the opinion – Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Anthony Kennedy, Sonia Sotomayor, and Clarence Thomas.

Sotomayor's concurring opinion is worth noting for its detailed analysis of the chilling effect on associational and expressive freedoms that government monitoring via technology, like GPS surveillance, will have if left unchecked. She wrote:

“GPS monitoring generates a precise, comprehensive record of a person’s public movements that reflects a wealth of detail about her familial, political, professional, religious and sexual associations…The Government can store such records and efficiently mine them for information for years into the future…And because GPS monitoring is cheap in comparison to conventional surveillance techniques and, by design, proceeds surreptitiously, it evades the ordinary checks that constrain abusive law enforcement practices: ‘limited police resources and community hostility.’ “

Justice Alito, who also concurred in the majority opinion, argued for warrants based on the “reasonable expectation of privacy” standard, instead of the common law trespass test applied by Scalia. Alito, clearly troubled by the Court’s reliance on the law of trespass, points out that technology today allows for easy electronic monitoring, without any need to come into physical contact with the subject being tracked. He expresses concern over the “increased convenience” of new technology at the “expense of privacy,” and suggests that these “new intrusions on privacy” may motivate Congress to enact legislation addressing these “new intrusions” as it did with wiretapping. Sotomayor clearly agrees, but whether Congress will act obviously remains to be seen.

So, what does U.S. v. Jones mean for employers?

Private employers generally are not subject to the Fourth Amendment’s prohibition against unreasonable search and seizure. However, it is certainly foreseeable that employees of private employers could cite to this case in support of claims that GPS monitoring, or any sort of electronic monitoring for that matter, during non-working hours violated their “reasonable expectation of privacy.” The question of whether this decision might influence courts as technology becomes more powerful, remains to be seen.

As such, it is imperative for employers, especially those who provide smart phones and company vehicles containing GPS monitoring devices to their employees, to adopt policies notifying their employees of the company’s right to monitor their actions while using Company owned property. These policies should also contain language notifying employees about the GPS monitoring capabilities of the Company-issued property and that they should not have an expectation of privacy while using the same.

In light of the contours of a “reasonable expectation of privacy” analysis and concerns over common law claims of intrusion upon one's seclusion, employers should also avoid monitoring during non-work hours. In addition, where the data received from location tracking reveals details of an employee’s personal life, employers should not review it or be prepared to show that they have a legitimate business justification for looking at this type of information.

Finally, private employers in states like California may have more to be concerned about where constitutional privacy protections apply to the private sector. A number of states also have laws prohibiting the installation of a tracking device without the consent of the vehicle’s owner or lessor.

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Co-Author:  Joseph J. Lazzarotti

The pervasiveness of social media in professional and everyday communication is a hot button issue (discussed at length here), particularly for private and public employers and organizations.  In fact, many organizations have adopted, or are considering adopting, social media policies for employees and providing training for how employees should interact in cyberspace.  But what should those policies say and what should the training focus on?

To answer those questions, organizations should, among other things, develop and shape their policies, training and discipline concerning social media with an eye toward their particular businesses, regulatory environments, and whether they are in the public or private sectors. A number of recent developments show why this is critical:

·         Two recent Third Circuit opinions handed down on June 13, 2011-- J.S. v. Blue Mountain School District and Layshock v. Hermitage School District (discussed below)-- illustrate the importance of educating employees (teachers and administrators) about student’s First Amendment rights concerning social media and when discipline is appropriate,

·         FTC’s guidelines for endorsement of products or services are important for businesses whose employees are likely to be commenting online about the company’s products and services,

·         The NLRB’s recent actions regarding social media use and the National Labor Relations Act are important for all employers, particularly those in traditionally union-dominated industries,

·         The use of social media in the health care setting is presenting a range of challenges under HIPAA and patient privacy generally.

In addressing the extent to which school officials can regulate student speech, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals has held that school officials violated students’ First Amendment free speech rights by disciplining students for creating, outside of school, “fake” social networking profiles ridiculing their school principals. 

In Blue Mountain School District, 8^th grader J.S., using her home computer, created a MySpace profile in the name of her principal.  The profile was presented as a self-portrayal of a bisexual Alabama middle-school principal named “M-Hoe,” and contained crude and vulgar content. Upon learning of the content, the School District suspended J.S. for 10 days.  The Court held that because J.S. was suspended for speech that caused no substantial disruption in school and that could not reasonably have led school officials to forecast substantial disruption in school, the School District’s actions violated J.S.’s First Amendment free speech rights.  

In Layshock, Justin Layshock, a high school senior, using his grandmother’s computer, also created a MySpace profile in the name of his principal.  The profile included “degrading” content regarding the principal.  Upon learning of the profile, the School District suspended Justin for 10 days.  In analyzing whether a school district may punish a student for expressive conduct that originated outside of the schoolhouse, did not disturb the school environment, and was not related to any school-sponsored event, the Court found the School District was prohibited from reaching beyond the school yard.  

These decisions were based on the Supreme Court’s landmark case on the First Amendment’s application to public schools is Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969).  In Tinker, a group of high school students decided to wear black armbands to school to protest the war in Vietnam.  When school officials learned of the plan, they preemptively prohibited students from wearing armbands.  Several students who ignored the prohibition and wore armbands to school were suspended.  Eventually, the students brought suit alleging their First Amendment rights had been violated.  The Supreme Court overruled the district and circuit courts, holding that student expression may not be suppressed unless school officials reasonably conclude that such expression will “materially and substantially" disrupt the work and discipline of the school. 

These cases demonstrate the court's struggle in addressing social media content, especially where there are additional constitutional concerns when a party is a public entity.  For many organizations, First Amendment issues will not be at issue, but there likely will be other considerations.  As each and every industry is impacted by social media, attempting to address it in a one-size-fits-all manner without taking appropriate considerations into account is not only impractical, but in some cases unlawful.  As these developments have shown, efforts to address social media must include an effective industry specific social media policy coupled with training programs to educate employees on the use of social media in all facets of employment and conducting the entity's business. 

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The Supreme Court today issued its decision in City of Ontario, California v. Quon.  In a unanimous decision, the Court held that the search of Quon's text messages, sent or received on his department issued pager, was reasonable and did not violate Quon's Fourth Amendment rights. 

As set forth in the opinion, the Court did not resolve the parties disagreement over Quon's privacy expectations, and instead disposed the case on the narrower grounds of the reasonableness of the search.  While the Court chose not to utilize the facts of this case to establish far-reaching premises that define the existence, and extent, of privacy expectations of employees using employer-provided communication devices, the Court did note that 

Employer policies concerning communications will of course shape the reasonable expectations of their employees, especially to the extent that such policies are clearly communicated.

Click here for a more in depth analysis of the decision. See our previous posts on Quon, here and here. 

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